The standard procedure in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants, yet many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations in the field, we usually have some clues concerning the characteristics of others; however, in some environments (such as e-commerce) these clues may not be very substantial. How will people respond to varying degrees of anonymity and social distance? We consider the effect of one form of social distance on behavior by comparing the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When these names were revealed, dictators allocated a significantly larger portion of the pie. However, this information had no significant effect on the offers in the ultimatum game, as it appears that strategic considerations crowd out impulses toward generosity or charity.
Introduction
The influence of social preferences on economic behavior has recently become a focus of considerable research. Participants in laboratory experiments frequently choose not to maximize their own material payoffs when social influences are present. In two of the classic experimental games, people allocate positive sums of money to anonymous strangers in the dictator game and reject positive monetary offers in the ultimatum game.
In these apparently simple games, there are some relevant and even delicate considerations that affect behavior. For example, Solnick and Schweitzer (1999) and Rosenblat (2001) demonstrate experimentally find that physical attractiveness affects behavior in the ultimatum game bargaining environment and the dictator game generosity context, respectively. Hoffman et al. (1994 Hoffman et al. ( , 1996 show that dictator game behavior was sensitive to whether the dictator believed that the experimenter could observe his or her choice. The degree of observability and relative anonymity is clearly reflected in the famous eight levels of charity (tzedakah) described by Maimonides (1998) .
A relevant issue is how robust such behavior is to variations in social distance, by which we mean the emotional proximity induced by the situation. This term that has been used in the social science literature at least since Bogardus (1928) . The idea is that people are expected to act more favorably toward those with a higher degree of social kinship. 1 The influence of social distance is a relevant concern for e-commerce, as there are typically no face-to-face interactions and behavior may be sensitive to subtle cues. The degree of generosity of potential philanthropists may also reflect considerations of perceived social distance.
Typical determinants of social distance are nationality, occupation, race, and religion; the weights assigned to each category vary somewhat across cultures. 2 Perceived social distance has been found to have effects even in laboratory settings; for example, a seminal social psychology experiment by Tajfel et al. (1971) finds that subjects strongly favor members of their experimental ingroup, even in a situation devoid of the usual trappings of ingroup membership.
As it is standard in economics experiments to maintain anonymity among the participants, there is generally only a rather limited range for perceived social distance. Roth (1995) points to a possible reason for this, suggesting that anonymity has become the rule due to concerns with the potential loss of control over the social environment, yet this point may be most appropriate when we are testing a theory based on the principle that people are selfish; if we suspect that people are not entirely selfish, we may instead be interested in the patterns of non-selfish concerns. 3 The emphasis in our paper is on the observation that many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity nor complete familiarity. When we are involved in interactive situations, we usually have some clues concerning the characteristics of others. It seems useful to investigate the influence of decreasing the social distance in a manner that avoids the loss of control discussed above. How will participants respond to a modest reduction in the degree of anonymity and social distance? Is there an interaction between the type of game (strategic or generosity-based) and this variable?
We study behavior in the dictator game and the ultimatum games. In our control treatments, the experimental procedure uses the standard set-up of anonymity only with respect to the other participant(s). As a treatment variable, we also conduct sessions in which the participants also learn the family name of their counterpart. 4 Participants from two different universities are used to ensure that this is the only additional information they receive (that is, they do not know their counterpart personally). The hypothesis tested is whether this additional information, regarded as irrelevant by traditional game theory, affects behavior simply by reducing the social distance between participants.
Previous work
Bohnet and Frey (1999) posit a hierarchy of "institutional characteristics" that determines the extent to which fairness considerations are active. With anonymity, one has only a purely intrinsic motivation to behave fairly; when people can identify each other, the fairness norm is partially activated; and when people can also communicate with each other, the fairness norm is strongly active.
Experiments with face-to-face bargaining and unrestricted communication indicate that behavior is different than with the standard anonymous environment. There are far fewer bargaining failures in the Nydegger and Owen (1975) face-to-face experiment than in a similar anonymous bargaining experiment by Roth and Malouf (1982) . This comparison also holds for the face-to-face bargaining in Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) compared to the anonymous bargaining in Binmore et al. (1989) . Radner and Schotter (1989) find that face-to-face bargaining yields 99 percent of the potential gains from trade, whereas anonymous bargaining achieves only 92 percent. However, face-to-face bargaining is an extreme case and may do more than simply remove anonymity. Roth suggests that face-to-face interactions may trigger social training that crowds out underlying preferences.
Some experiments have investigated the effect of increasing social distance beyond the standard laboratory anonymity condition, where participants can see each other before and after (and even during) an experiment, share common traits (e.g., school, age group, nationality), and may well be friends or acquaintances. Charness et al. (2007) explore the effect of increasing social distance by comparing behavior in a classroom experiment and in an Internet experiment. While they find significantly less influence for social preferences in the virtual environment, the patterns across the treatments are surprisingly similar, and most people exhibit a willingness to sacrifice money. Hoffman et al. (1994) were the first to employ a double-blind procedure in which subjects are also guaranteed anonymity with respect to the experimenters. This higher degree of anonymity effectively increased the social distance and was found to induce changes in behavior. 5 The authors suggest that what may seem like fair behavior may be due not to a taste for fairness, but due to a social concern for what others think. They argue that traditional non-cooperative game theory is about strangers with no shared history, so that we should follow this guideline in testing the theory.
Bohnet and Frey (1999) conduct dictator games at the University of Zurich. In addition to the baseline dictator game, types of visual identification are varied in three treatments. In two-way identification, all subjects were asked to stand up and look at each other for a few seconds. In both of the two one-way identification treatments, recipients held cards with identification numbers; in one of these treatments, recipients also told the audience their names, majors, hobbies, and "where they came from." Their data clearly reject the hypothesis that the distribution of allocations is the same in all treatments. While the cumulative distribution of offers does not provide significant differences between every pair of treatments, it is worth noting that providing verbal information traditionally considered relevant to social distance does appear to increase allocations. 6 Bolle (1998) finds that people seem to anticipate that one's name can have an effect on another person's behavior. In his "Rewarding Trust Game", the first mover can choose to forego an outcome in which she would receive 80 and the other person would receive 0, or to allow the second mover to unilaterally apportion 160 between the two parties. In his design, each second mover was asked to choose rewards for two first movers, and only some of the decisions were chosen for payoff. An innovation is that each first mover chose a pseudonym, which was shown to the second mover. There were seven cases where a second mover chose different rewards for two trusting first movers. Thirteen economics students (peers to the experimental participants) were later asked to predict which pseudonym received a higher reward in each of these cases. In five of the seven cases, one of the paired pseudonyms was guessed to have received a higher reward by more than 60 percent of the evaluators. In each of these five instances, the guess was correct.
Experimental design
Our 2 × 2 experimental design varied the game (ultimatum or dictator) and whether family names were provided to the first movers.
The ultimatum game was first studied in Güth et al. (1982) . This is a two-player game in which one player (the proposer) provisionally receives an amount of money ("the pie") and makes a proposal to the other player (the responder) regarding how to divide this money between them. If the responder accepts the proposed split, it is implemented; otherwise, both players receive zero. The dictator game is a simpler form of the ultimatum game, where one player (the allocator) receives an amount of money and makes a unilateral decision on how to divide it. The other player (the recipient) must accept this split of the pie. In both games, on the assumption that people are only concerned with maximizing own monetary payoffs, the unique Nash equilibrium is for the first mover to take all the money for herself.
Our experiments were conducted at Tilburg University and the University of Amsterdam using first year undergraduate students in economics. In each of the dictator and ultimatum games, 60 participants (30 pairs) were assigned to each of the two treatments. In all treatments, the first mover (allocator or proposer) was from Tilburg University, and the recipient or responder was from Amsterdam University. Each participant was told that her counterpart was a student at the other university. The amount of the pie was 100 points, each worth 0.25 Guilders ($0.60 at that time). Each participant was paid privately according to the decision(s) made. Table 1 shows the allocations and proposals made in each of the four treatments: First, in line with all previous literature, there are substantial differences between first-mover behavior in dictator games and ultimatum games. The dictator game is one of generosity, since the recipient is effectively helpless. On the other hand, the ultimatum game has a strategic component since a proposer may (correctly) fear that the responder will reject a small offer. Accordingly, offers in the ultimatum games average far more than allocations in the dictator games.
Results
We find an interesting interaction effect between knowing the name and the type of game. In the dictator game, we find that providing family names results in more generous allocations. However, in the ultimatum game revealing the name of the recipient had no significant effect on behavior.
The allocators who were told family names gave about 50 percent more than those who were not told this information. Of these, 43 percent (13 of 30) of the dictators in the name treatment gave their counterpart at least 50 percent of the pie, 7 compared with only 20 percent (6 of 30) in the no name treatment. Only 27 percent of the participants in the name treatment gave 0, compared to 43 percent in the no name treatment. The allocations in the two treatments are significantly different both by a rank-sum Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test [Z = 2.15, p < 0.03] and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on cumulative distributions [χ 2 = 8.07, 2 d.f., p < 0.02]. 8 On the other hand, although there is a slight tendency to make higher offers in the ultimatum game when told the family name of the responder, the average proposals were quite similar in the ultimatum treatments. This lack of a significant difference is confirmed by both the Wilcoxon A total of five proposals were rejected, four in the no names treatment (15, 30(2), and 40) and one in the names treatment (10). Since there were more low offers in the no names treatment and since the rejection sample is very small, we cannot draw any definite conclusions about rejection behavior. Nevertheless, payoff efficiency in the ultimatum game is somewhat higher (97-87 percent) when family names are provided. The test of differences in proportions gives Z = 1.40, not significant at conventional levels (p = 0.16). 9 7 Note that one even gave 55 percent of the pie. 8 See Siegel and Castellan (1988) for descriptions of these tests. 9 The specific test statistic is Z = (p 1 − p 2 )/S pc , where p i is the proportion of B choices following a B signal in subsample i, and
) is an estimate of the standard error of p 1 − p 2 . p c is an estimate of the population proportion under the null hypothesis of equal proportions, p c = (p 1 N 1 + p 2 N 2 )/(N 1 + N 2 ), where N i is the total number of B signals in subsample i. See Glasnapp and Poggio (1985) . Camerer and Thaler (1995, p. 216) write, "In some hotels, the person who cleans the room signs a card, presumably to increase tips. We suspect this ploy works. If so, perhaps offers in the dictator game would increase if the Allocator knew that the Responder's name was Pat (though not which Pat). This is related to the well-known phenomenon that people are willing to pay more to save a 'known' life than a statistical life. At the social level, leaving a girl in a well to die is beyond rude, but doing nothing about an unsafe highway is acceptable behavior." 10 The results reported in this paper indeed support this conjecture. As Camerer and Thaler argue, to some extent the dictator game is similar to leaving a tip for the cleaner. Indeed, our limited intervention seems to have reduced the social distance between the participants in the dictator game enough to have a significant effect on allocations. However, providing the same information in the ultimatum game had little effect on the proposals.
Discussion
Clearly, the two games are very different from each other. 11 The dictator game is one of "charity," with some perceived social norm for sharing the experimental proceeds and some degree of willingness to comply with it. In this situation, generosity may be inversely related to experienced social distance, which is sensitive to whether a name is provided. 12 In contrast, the ultimatum game has components of both generosity and strategy. The game seems framed more like a strategic choice where one tries to extract as much surplus from the game as possible, regardless of the social distance. In effect, the evident strategic considerations crowd out impulses of generosity. 13 A striking parallel example of the effects of framing is seen in Liberman et al. (2004) . In their study, the same Prisoner's Dilemma game was played in two treatments, where this game was labeled as either "The Community Game" or "The Wall St. Game." Seventy-one percent of participants chose the cooperative play in the first treatment, compared to only 33 percent in the latter case. In our ultimatum game experiments, strategic considerations appear to outweigh the modest difference in social distance induced by providing the surname. 14 People typically have some cues or signals about their counterparts in field interactions. Given the contemporary trend toward interaction at a distance (e.g., e-commerce), there may only be limited amounts of information available, such as another party's name. We have seen that the degree of sensitivity is itself sensitive to the nature (or framing) of the game. Thus, it seems important to investigate the sensitivity of behavior to the differences in social distance that can be induced in a laboratory or Internet setting.
Social distance seems to cut across many dimensions, particularly in environments without face-to-face interaction. While it is not surprising that demographic information about race, religion, and nationality can affect behavior, additional concerns in the laboratory include whether other people (either participants or the experimenter) can identify one's behavior. Dufwenberg and Muren (2006) provide an interesting example in a dictator game conducted in a classroom, where only a couple of people were randomly chosen to receive monetary payoffs. Fewer dictators allocate positive amounts to recipients when they must go on stage to receive payment. This is especially true when male dictators know they are paired with other males.
We close with a brief discussion of two related papers recently published in this journal. Frohlich et al. (2001) find that measures taken to ensure anonymity in a double-blind dictator design lead to doubts concerning whether one is actually paired with a real person who would receive any money allocated; such doubts are significantly negatively correlated with giving. In addition, many participants indicated that they viewed the experiment as a form of 'game' they were trying to win; such views are also negatively correlated with giving. Burnham (2003) also uses a doubleblind dictator design, using photographs to effect differences in social distance. Dictators view pictures of recipients or recipients view pictures of dictators. In either case, dictators allocate significantly more than in the control treatment with photographs. Interestingly, allocations are highest when dictators view recipient pictures.
This behavior can be seen in the light of the Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) 'let down aversion' or the Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) 'guilt aversion.' In this view, people wish to avoid unpleasant feelings resulting from acting too selfishly. The degree of guilt experienced is likely to depend on the degree of social distance involved. One's uncertainty about whether there is a real recipient has the effect of making the recipient much less salient in one's decision. If a dictator considers this choice to be a game one is supposed to try to win, he or she will experience very little guilt from selfish behavior. Regarding the Burnham study, it is easy to see how providing pictures will lower social distance. While a dictator fearing retaliation might give more when his or her picture is provided, guilt is more likely to play a role when a dictator can see the face of the person who is being treated poorly.
Further research may delineate clear patterns regarding the dimensions and determinants of social distance; perhaps the failure to implement the grand research goal of Siegel and Fouraker (1960) has caused economists' efforts to understand these to be incomplete. Social preferences would seem to have more influence in situations that are perceived to be less strategic in nature. A crucial step is to learn more about the different effects of reducing social distance across different environments.
